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INTRODUCTION 
“Cyberspace.”  It is difficult to define, notwithstanding its 
ubiquitous nature, perhaps because of its mutable characteristics.1  At the 
same time, cyberspace makes the Internet unique as “an inherently 
borderless medium of communication.”2  The Internet has undeniably 
become a global digital phenomenon. 
Trying to define cyberspace in clear terms is challenging.  One 
court defined it as a “world of electronic communications over computer 
networks.”3  Scholars prefer a more complex definition, referring to a 
cyberspace as an “evolving man-made domain for the organization and 
transfer of data . . . a combination of private and public property 
governed by technical rule sets designed primarily to facilitate the flow 
of information.”4  
Cyberspace is consistently growing, with at times unidentifiable 
interconnections, most of it in the private sector.5  Thus, establishing a 
national framework for cybersecurity is no easy task.6  A coherent 
framework, however, is necessary7 and important, as “thousands of 
interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches and fiber optic 
cables” that comprise cyberspace are crucial for the proper functioning 
of critical infrastructures.8  Cyberattacks can instantaneously cross 
international borders through cyberspace, implicating computers in 
countries long distances apart.9  A more defined structure would make it 
1. See Lance Strate, The Varieties of Cyberspace: Problems in Definition and
Delimitation, 63 W. J. OF COMM. 382, 382–83 (1999).  
2. Susanna Bagdasarova, Brave New World: Challenges in International Cybersecurity
Strategy and the Need for Centralized Governance, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1012 (2015) 
(citing Jessica E. Bauml, It's a Mad, Mad Internet: Globalization and the Challenges 
Presented by Internet Censorship, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 697, 703 (2011)).  
3. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1365 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  
4. Bagdasarova, supra note 2, at 1010–11 (quoting Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in
Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 
65, 68 (2009)).  
5. ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32777, CREATING A NATIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR CYBERSECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND OPTIONS 6 (2005), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32777.pdf.  
6. See id.
7. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE vii (Feb. 2003),
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf. 
8. Id. at vii.
9. Mark Landler & John Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/
29estonia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (in the April 2007 cyber attack on Estonia's networks, 
a network of bots located as far away as Vietnam or the United States were used to increase 
the assault’s impact).  
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easier to react to such unusual circumstances.10
Security risks have grown exponentially with the use of the Internet 
and data storage systems.11  Cybercrime is now abundant in cyberspace, 
harming the world’s economy and costing billions of dollars in 
damages.12  In response to cyber threats, the international community 
has responded with an array of solutions, including international 
conventions, national strategies, agreements, summits, and 
organizations.13  Unfortunately, all of them lack coherent and mutual 
structure. 
China, the second largest economy in the world, has the most 
Internet users.14  It is an undeniably important participant in the global 
cyber community.  The country represents nearly twenty-two percent of 
total users with more than the United States of America, India, and Japan 
combined.15  As of 2017, the United States had over a quarter-billion of 
the world’s Internet users, and is now third only behind China and 
India.16  Therefore, the strategies and cybersecurity regulations of China 
and the United States can provide necessary insights into the nature of 
cybersecurity policies in general.  They also reveal flaws in an area so 
important to the world’s economic development and international 
cooperation. 
Chinese views on cybersecurity and threats of terrorism provide us 
with some helpful insights.17  The outward unanimous support of China’s 
official goal of cyber sovereignty suggests that a change in their current 
position is unlikely.18  Thus, the People’s Republic of China (the PRC) 
10. FISHER, supra note 5 at 6–7.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. at 13; Jeff Kosseff, The Cybersecurity Privilege, 12 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 261 (2016); Emmanuel Darmois & Geneviève Schméder, Cybersecurity: A Case for a 
European Approach, 7 (2016), http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/02/WP11_Cybersecurity_FinalEditedVersion.pdf.  
13. William M. Stahl, Note, The Uncharted Waters of Cyberspace: Applying the
Principles of International Maritime Law to the Problem of Cybersecurity, 40 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 247, 263–65 (2011).  
14. Internet Users by Country, INTERNETLIVESTATS.COM (last visited Jan. 13, 2017),
http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/.  
15. Id.
16. Top 20 Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users,
INTERNETWORLDSTATS.COM (June 30, 2017), http://www.internetworldstats.com/
top20.htm.  
17. Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations, China 
Leadership Monitor no. 42, Oct. 7, 2013, at 16, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/
CLM42MS_092013Carnegie.pdf.  
18. Id.; “China is a high context society in which most people share a common set of
norms, values, and beliefs.” DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN 
CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 63 (2012).  
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will likely continue to improve their cyber capabilities for both national 
security and economic purposes.19
This comment talks about the tension between the United States and 
China over cybersecurity and its impact on international trade.20  The 
comment then discusses the most pressing concerns resulting from 
China’s new controversial Cybersecurity Law (the CSL), enacted on 
November 7, 2016.21  Finally, this comment proposes for global powers 
like China and the United States, to adopt an integrated European Union 
(the EU) style approach to cyber security, which rejects “technological 
determinism and mass surveillance.”22 
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cybersecurity tensions between the U.S. and China
The USA National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
provides a useful definition of cybersecurity: “[t]he ability to protect or 
defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks.”23  The world’s two 
major powers, the United States of America and China are both equipped 
for aggressive cyber-war.24  Such power comes with enormous 
responsibilities.  
Thus, it is important to distinguish who is using cyber warfare 
capabilities and for what purposes.25  Does the country use its abilities to 
push political agendas against civil societies?26  Does the country have a 
genuine policy of using its cyber skills to defend its citizens?27  Or, more 
realistically, does it employ both strategies?  Both the United States and 
China are known for their use of cyber security “in the name of the fight 
against terrorism.”28  However, the Snowden revelations brought the 
degree of U.S. secret illegal cyberspace operations to light.29  To which 
19. Swaine, supra note 17, at 16.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Darmois & Schmeder, supra note 12, at 5; see infra Part V.
23. Darmois & Schmeder, supra note 12, at 5 (citing Richard Kissel, Glossary of Key
Information Security Terms, 58 (May 2013), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/
NIST.IR.7298r2.pdf.  
24. See id.; see also John R. Lindsey, Inflated Cybersecurity Threat Escalates US-China
Mistrust, HUFFPOST (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-r-
lindsay/cybersecurity-threat-escalates-us-china-mistrust_b_7302282.html.  
25. Darmois & Schmeder, supra note 12, at 9.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1,
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-
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the global community questioned U.S. compliance with democratic 
principles.30  
The revelations showed that the National Security Agency targeted 
not only other countries, but also ordinary citizens, making the life of 
active participants in civil society more difficult.31  The United States’ 
use of counter-technology is an example of the blurred lines between the 
government’s goal of preventing terrorist attacks and public use of 
protective technologies.32  Likewise, in China, the true motives behind 
cybersecurity regulations are often unclear. 
The views on cybersecurity between the United States and China 
differ starting at the basic ideological level.  From an American 
perspective, the ideal Internet is an open, secure platform, free for all to 
enjoy.33  The Chinese start from a completely different position.34  The 
Chinese government decided a long time ago that it wants to be in 
“control of the narrative about . . . China’s rise.”35  China wants to be 
completely independent from other countries, which largely prompted 
the idea of cyber sovereignty within the country.  
 Independence, innovation, and inner prosperity push the Chinese 
government to do so.36  Wariness of the technology trap and a desire to 
transcend their manufacturing economy motivates China’s impatience 
and enormous investment in Research and Development.37  An ambition 
for self-sufficiency38 also explains China’s alleged hacking, spying, and 
stealing of important corporate data by the PRC intelligence.39  
 The Snowden revelations put the United States in an interesting 
position, to say the least.40  China had always assumed that the United 
States was hacking into their networks even before the revelations.41  The 
NSA and other government agencies were, in fact, breaking into Chinese 
surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1.  
30. Darmois & Schmeder, supra note 12, at 10.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The Christian Science Monitor, Cybersecurity from China’s Perspective, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XINwf7xj5to&t=292s [hereinafter 




37. Id.; see generally Justin Yifu Lin, Economic Growth and Development, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY 76–89 (Gregory C. Chow & Dwight H. 
Perkins eds., 2015) (describing the reasons for and costs of China’s transition to a dynamic 
economy).  
38. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 15.
39. See Science Monitor, supra note 33.
40. See generally Macaskill, supra note 29.
41. See Science Monitor, supra note 33.
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networks in search of political and military secrets.42  Curiously, the U.S. 
government differentiates between good hacking and bad hacking, with 
political espionage considered good.43  Bad hacking, accordingly, occurs 
when, for instance, the Chinese allegedly hack into a foreign company’s 
network to steal intellectual property to help domestic private and state 
owned companies become more competitive and independent.44 
As a dim glimmer of hope, the two countries have finally tried to 
work out some of the pressing cybersecurity issues.  In 2015, President 
of China, Xi Jinping, while visiting the U.S., signed a cyber agreement 
that prohibits both countries from knowingly supporting cyber theft of 
intellectual property for the economic advantage of domestic 
companies.45  The 2015 visit was a success, considering that just two 
years prior, at a summit in California, the two presidents could not reach 
any consensus on cybersecurity.46  
China’s alleged cyber attacks have worried both the United States 




45. See John W. Rollins, U.S.–China Cyber Agreement, CRS INSIGHT (Oct. 16, 2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10376.pdf; accord Julie Hirshfield Davis & David E. Sanger, 
Obama and Xi Jinping of China Agree to Take Steps on Cybertheft, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-white-house.html; accord 
Demetri Sevastopulo & Geoff Dyer, Obama and Xi in deal on cyber espionage, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/0dbcab36-63be-11e5-a28b-
50226830d644. 
46. Compare Gary Brown & Christopher D. Yung, Evaluating the US-China
Cybersecurity Agreement, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 19, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/
2017/01/evaluating-the-us-china-cybersecurity-agreement-part-1-the-us-approach-to-
cyberspace/ (supporting the claim that a first agreement of its kind, reached during the 2015 
Chinese President’s United States visit, was a positive step), with SCOTT WARREN HARROLD 
ET AL., GETTING TO YES WITH CHINA IN CYBERSPACE 10 (2016), https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1335/RAND_RR1335.pdf (concluding 
that the results of the 2013 summit were exiguous because of China’s denial of cyber 
espionage); and Charles Riley, Obama and Xi fail to bridge cybersecurity gap, CNN MONEY 
U.S. (June 10, 2013, 5:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/10/news/obama-china-
cybersecurity (“no firm commitments on cyber-related issues were secured at the 
conference”). 
47. See Magnus Hjortdal, China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic
Deterrence, 4 J. OF STRATEGIC SECURITY 6 (2011), http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/
jss/vol4/iss2/2 (last visited Dec 28, 2016); see also Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, 26 
Emory Int'l L. Rev. 733, 784–86 (2012) (citing China, Not India, Behind Cyber Attacks: US, 
HINDUSTAN TIMES (India) (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-
news/Europe/China-not-India-behind-cyber-attack-US/Articlel -800051.aspx, and Charles 
Arthur, China 'Targeted 48 Chemical and Military Companies in Hacking Attack, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://www. guardian. co.uk/technology/2011 /nov/01 /china-hacking-
chemical- military-companies) (naming several instances of cyber-attacks linked to China but 
disguised as coming from other sources); for a discussion of China’s harmful cyber attacks 
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Journal (the WSJ) in its article on the world’s cyber forces stated that 
China “[o]ften uses high-volume attacks with a large number of 
operatives in military or outside groups linked to [the] government who 
bombard targets.”48  According to the WSJ, a list of suspected acts by the 
Chinese in recent years includes: 
2009: Theft of data from Google Inc. and other tech companies. 
2009: Discovery of theft of plans for U.S. Joint Strike Fighter 
project.  
2010: Attacks on British executives.  
2011: Attack on South Korean Internet portal. 
2013: Major U.S. media companies hacked.  
2015: “Great Cannon” directs massive amounts of traffic to take 
anticensorship websites offline.  
2015: Hack of U.S. Office of Personnel Management.49 
Particularly, China has often been a suspect of industrial espionage 
aimed at increasing its competitiveness globally.50 
Although, the United States is no innocent bystander when it comes 
to hacking.51  The WSJ talks about the United States’ cyber warfare 
capabilities, as headed by the NSA and Cyber Command.52  The United 
States’ attacks are known for their complexity and sophisticated 
techniques, as the country has been active in the field for nearly two 
decades.53  The list of suspected acts includes:  
2010: Discovery of computer worm that destroyed centrifuges at 
Iranian nuclear plant. 
2010: Surveillance of EU offices. 
2011: Attack on Gemalto, a European maker of mobile SIM cards, 
against the United States see Jack Goldsmith, How Cyber Changes the Laws of War, 24 Eur. 
J. Int'l L. 129, 131 (2013). 
48. Jenifer Valentino-Devries & Danny Yadron, Cataloging the World's Cyberforces, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 11, 2015, 8:45 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/
cataloging-the-worlds-cyberforces-1444610710. 
49. See id. (Hydraq, which was found in Google attack and others, and Sakula, which
was found in OPM attack and others, were identified as malware used in those attacks). 
50. RICHARD STIENNON, SURVIVING CYBERWAR 49, 15 (2010); Gordon G. Chang,
Obama’s Summit with Xi Jingping: Where’s the Tough Love?, THE DAILY BEAST (Jun. 9, 
2013, 4:45 AM), http:// www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/09/obama-s-summit-with-
xi-jinping-where-s-the-tough-love.html (according to some of the estimates by government 
officials, intellectual property theft, ascribed to alleged Chinese hackers, causes U.S. 
companies to lose $250 billion each year). 
51. Jyh-An Lee, The Red Storm in Uncharted Waters: China and International Cyber
Security, 82 UMKC L. Rev. 951, 953 (2014). 
52. See Valentino-Devries & Yadron, supra note 48. 
53. See id.
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likely with Britain’s GCHQ.”54
Flame, a type of espionage malware; Stuxnet, used in the Iranian 
attack; and GrayFish, a high-level malware able to attack computer 
“firmware” at the heart of the computer’s hard drive and resurrect itself, 
are only some used by the US intelligence.55  
Considering that the PRC has impressive capabilities of aggressive 
cyber-intrusion, nations cannot simply ignore the possible threat of cyber 
attacks on their networks.56  In addition to targeting governments, the 
alleged Chinese attackers infiltrate private sector companies.57  Some 
American enterprises, which have become victims of cyber attacks in the 
recent years, include Apple, Facebook, Google, Twitter, and the 
Washington Post.58  
As mentioned earlier, China sees itself not as an initiator, but rather 
a victim of the cyber attacks, often condemning similar hacking by the 
United States of Chinese computer systems.59  And in fact, the 
modernization of Chinese cyber weapons and improvement of its 
hacking abilities is prescribed due to “pressures caused by American 
technological power.”60  
On an optimistic note, both powers have shown initiative and 
willingness to engage in the common resolution of cybersecurity 
issues.61  As both the U.S. and China understand that setting international 
rules for cybersecurity is important, they seem to be willing to 
cooperate.62
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Lee, supra note 51, at 953 (citing Ron Rosenbaum, Richard Clarke on
Who Was Behind the Stuxnet Attack, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Apr. 2012), http:// 
www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/Richard-Clarke-on-Who-Was-Behind-the-
Stuxnet-Attack.html). 
56. See Hjortdal, supra note 47, at 6 (citing China: Pushing Ahead of the Cyberwarfare
Pack, STRATFOR (Mar. 2, 2009, 3:27 PM), https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-
pushing-ahead-cyberwarfare-pack) (“Analysts say that China could well have the most 
extensive and aggressive cyber warfare capability in the world.”). 
57. Lee, supra note 51, at 954.
58. Stephen Moore, Cyber Attacks and the Beginnings of an International Cyber Treaty,
39 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 223, 253 (2014); Riley, supra note 46. 
59. Lee, supra note 51, at 957–58.
60. Id. at 958.
61. Lee, supra note 51, at 958. 
62. See id. at 958. For a statement by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on the need to make
fewer accusations and contribute more to cybersecurity, see Terril Yue Jones and Benjamin 
Kang Lim, China's New Premier Seeks “New Type” of Ties with U.S., REUTERS(Mar. 17, 
2013, 4:02 AM),  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-hacking/chinas-new-
premier-seeks-new-type-of-ties-with-u-s-idUSBRE92G02320130317. 
2018] CHINA'S NEW CYBERSECURITY LAW 145 
1. Cultural factors, which impacted China’s new Cybersecurity
Law. 
The PRC has been a state-controlled economy since its founding in 
1948 until 1978 when economic reforms took place.63  The state 
controlled capital apportionment for investment in business 
enterprises.64  Banks mostly lent money to enterprises not to increase 
productivity, but rather for political reasons.65  The apparent preference, 
given to domestic companies in China, also dates back to the emphasis 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as “essential units of the state and the 
foundation of the economy.”66  
During the 1949–1978 period, China did not engage in foreign trade 
with other nations with a few slight exceptions.67  The country’s focus 
was mainly inward.68  This isolationism, typical of the present day 
economic policies, developed because foreign imperial powers 
dominated the country from 1850 to 1949 and suppressed China’s 
power.69
Because of the political chaos and unwise economic policies, before 
the economic reforms were promulgated in 1978, China’s economy 
suffered from stagnation, inefficiency, and almost no economic 
growth.70  
Considering such a turbulent history and weak economic state, 
China’s transition to one of the fastest growing economies in only three 
decades is noteworthy.71  However, with a population of approximately 
1.331 billion and a Gross Domestic Product of $5.11 trillion in 2009,72
China is still a developing country.73  China remains a comparatively 
poor country in general, and ranks as one of the world’s lowest-income 
63. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 12.
64. Id. at 14 (In the US, by contrast, capital is allocated to enterprises through different
market mechanisms, like the sale of stocks or bonds, venture capital borrowing and 
reinvestment of excess earnings). 
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 15.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 16–17.
71. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 19 (with nearly 10 percent growth rate on average,
such dramatic improvement is unprecedented). 
72. The World Bank, China, http://data.worldbank.org/country/china (last visited Jan. 3, 
2018).  
73. Bauml, supra note 2, at 724 (citing International Monetary Fund, Restoring
Confidence Without Harming Recovery 2, tbl.1 (July 7, 2010), http:// www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2010/update/02/pdf/0710.pdf). 
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countries.74  It is a nation still in search of its ground.75  Thus, holding 
China to American democratic standards at this stage might be 
unrealistic.76 
It is also important to note that the Communist Party, just like the 
People’s Action Party of Singapore, has achieved the above-mentioned 
economic success without relaxing political control.77  The Communist 
Party is likely here to stay.78  It will continue to keep a tight grip on the 
economy, at times making decisions that directly affect business 
ventures out of purely political ambitions.79  While economic progress 
and foreign investment to China drives its global dominance, political 
and social stability within the country is its number one priority.80  
Likewise, “China’s foreign policy behavior, including its cyber 
activity, is driven primarily by the domestic political imperative to 
protect the longevity of the Chinese Communist Party.”81  All of the 
objectives, such as ensuring stability, territorial integrity, innovation, 
and continuing economic growth, while taking steps to prepare for a 
possible militarized cyber conflict, support the continuation of the 
Communist Party.82  Laws and regulations in China allow for flexibility 
of interpretation, which benefits Chinese nation’s interests.83 
Preservation of the economic activity through information and 
communication technology becomes any nations’ primary objective 
when safeguarding cyberspace.84 Cybersecurity is integral to economic 
prosperity,85 which is why countries must secure activities like banking, 
services, administration, and so forth, to protect the stakeholders and 
74. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 20; see, e.g, Bauml, supra note 2, at 724.
75. See Bauml, supra note 2, at 725.
76. Id.
77. Special Report, The Singapore Exception, THE ECONOMIST (Jul. 18, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21657606-continue-flourish-its-second-
half-century-south-east-asias-miracle-city-state (“Singapore is [...] the only one among the 
world’s richest countries never to have changed its ruling party”); see generally CHOW & 
HAN, supra note 18 (noting China’s economic progress over the years despite the strong hold 
of the Communist Party on this developing country). 
78. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 21.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Amy Chang, Warring State: China’s Cybersecurity Strategy, CTR. FOR A NEW AM.




84. PASCAL BRANGETTO & MARI KERT-SAINT AUBYN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES, PROJECT REPORT, 9 (2015), https://ccdcoe.org/
sites/ default/files/multimedia/pdf/Economics%20of%20cybersecurity.pdf. 
85. See id. 
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increase  their societies’ wealth.86 
2. “Made in China” technology protectionism.
After the reforms of 1978, China quickly became an important
player in the world trade market.87  China’s fame as the world’s largest 
exporter of goods is familiar to anyone who has ever bought a product 
“made in China.”88  The influxes of foreign direct investment and access 
to the world’s most valuable technology via multinational companies 
(MNC’s) established in China has made China’s foreign trade an engine 
of economic development.89  Domestic Chinese enterprises inevitably 
absorb the intellectual property of companies entering the Chinese 
market and begin to close the technology gap, enabling China to become 
ever so competitive in the global marketplace.90  Also, the 
undervaluation of the Renminbi allows China to keep its goods at prices, 
which are lower than market exchange rate, increasing its exports.91 
 The common perception in China is that the United States is 
constantly critiquing Chinese actions in the world market and its 
protection of intellectual property rights.92 
Consequently, China is extremely sensitive to any heavy-handed 
tactics by foreign countries, which it usually meets with resentment.93  
This influences the isolationist view of the Chinese government, which 
often feels pressured by other nations into an unwanted westernization 
of its principles. 
In recent years, the strive for technological independence has led 
China to increase its Internet security and to further develop its own 
information technology (IT).  In the beginning of 2014, China pushed 
the development of Chinese operating systems based on Linux.94  The 
86. Id.
87. Reuters Staff, TIMELINE: China Milestones Since 1978, REUTERS (DEC. 7, 2008,
11:33 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-reforms-chronology-sb/timeline-china-
milestones-since-1978-idUKTRE4B711V20081208.  
88. Investopedia, What Country is the World’s Largest Exporter of Goods? (Jan. 19,
2015, 9:11 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/011915/what-country-worlds-
largest-exporter-goods.asp.  
89. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 29-30 (if for example, an MNC establishes a
subsidiary in China to manufacture complex machinery, the MNC has to give access to 
Chinese counterpart to its proprietary technology). 
90. Id. at 319.
91. Id.
92. CHOW & HAN, supra note 18, at 325.
93. Id.
94. Hauke Johannes Gierow, Cyber Security in China: Internet Security, Protectionism
and Competitiveness: New Challenges to Western Businesses, CHINA MONITOR, Issue 2, 
(Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/China_Monitor_22_
Cybersecurity_EN.pdf.  
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idea was to run it on computers used in the government sphere and 
security relevant businesses.95  China has been enforcing stringent 
limitations on the use of foreign tech, fearing network surveillance via 
installed back doors and the threat to its national security.96  Sealing off 
the internal market from external impacts, promotes policies of industrial 
and innovative development and further bolsters the competitiveness of 
domestic companies.97  In spite of its great progress in the technological 
field, China still depends on foreign high-tech.98 
State-run telecommunications companies (China Telecom, China 
Unicom, and China Mobile) dominate the market with their 
investments.99  Decisions they make, usually approved by the 
government, determine what kind of technologies will be developed, 
thus defining the framework for the industry and its regulation.100  
Additionally, the Chinese government endorses its own technological 
standards through state-run programs, generally in close collaboration 
with IT companies like ZTE, Lenovo, and Datang Mobile for instance.101  
However, it is not clear whether China’s strive for independence will 
enhance network security as a whole.102  Unfortunately, many IT 
companies in China still ignore crucial quality standards required for 
software security.103 
The reliance of domestic companies on Chinese encryption 
methods poses yet another problem.104  Unlike the international 
encryption standards, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),105 
domestic ones allow only partial protection.106  Chinese suppliers have 
to deposit a type of ‘skeleton key’ with the National Encryption Leading 




97. Gierow, supra note 92.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Ernst Dieter & Naughton Barry, China’s Emerging Industrial Economy: Insight from 
the IT Industry, in CHINA’S EMERGENT POL. ECON.: CAPITALISM IN THE DRAGON’S LAIR, 39, 
39–59 (Christopher A. McNally ed., 2008).  
101. Gierow, supra note 92.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3.
105. RSA is a public-key cryptosystem, used for secure data transfer, specifically for data
transmission “over an insecure network such as the Internet.”  Margaret Rouse, RSA Algorithm 
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), TECHTARGET (last visited on Oct. 4, 2017), http://
searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/RSA.  
106. Id.
107. Christopher T. Cloutier & Jane Y Cohen, Casting a Wide Net: China’s Encryption
2018] CHINA'S NEW CYBERSECURITY LAW 149 
Starting from 2015, fifteen percent of computers in official offices 
across China have started to convert from Windows to Chinese owned 
operating systems.108  The Chinese government highly promotes 
NeoKylin OS and Red Flag Linux systems.109  The problem is that 
Chinese technologies are not reliable yet.110  Compared to Western-run 
applications, the alternative operating systems China offers111 have a lot 
more security drawbacks with numerous virus-infested apps.112 
Mandatory Internet censorship is another problem for Chinese 
companies, exacerbating international criticism of isolationism and 
protectionism.113  The Chinese government explains that Internet 
restrictions, like the blocking of Google and Facebook, promote security 
and protect Chinese citizens against terrorism.114  Аbiding by the 
Chinese government’s restrictions gets expensive.115 “The existing 
Chinese microblogging sites have had to invest in huge armies of 
individuals who spend their time looking through the content and 
determining what should or shouldn’t be removed.”116 Thus, censorship 
affects freedom of speech and impacts the economy of the whole 
country.117  
Foreign companies unquestionably feel the impact of Chinese 
censorship and exposure to cyber attacks.118  International collaboration 
with services such as Gmail, Google Docs, and Dropbox are increasingly 
restrictions, WORLDECR (Nov. 2011), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/
publication/2011articles/11-11WorldECRCloutierCohen.pdf (For a definition of RSA 
algorithm see Margaret Rouse, RSA Algorythm (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), TECHTARGET.COM 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2017), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/RSA).  
108. Gierow, supra note 92, at 4–5.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id.
111. Gierow, supra note 92, at 4 (Google Play, for example, is blocked in China, so
companies like Baidu, Tencent or Qihoo 360 offer substitute app stores). 
112. Id. (citing Max Eddy, Nearly 7,000 Malicious Android Apps Infest China's
Appstores, PCMAG.COM (Aug. 27, 2013, 2:05 PM), http://securitywatch.pcmag.com/mobile-
security/315218-nearly-7-000-malicious-android-apps-infest-china-s-appstores) (“The Anzhi 
and EoeMarket [app] stores were the worst offenders.”). 
113. Id.
114. Reuters, China is Another Step Closer to Controversial Cybersecurity Law,
FORTUNE (June 27, 2016, 5:22 AM) http://fortune.com/2016/06/27/china-moves-toward-
adopting-cybersecurity-law/ [hereinafter Controversial Cybersecurity Law].  
115. Victor Luckerson, Why China is a Nightmare for American Internet Companies,
TIME (Feb. 27, 2014), http://time.com/10178/why-china-is-a-nightmare-for-american-
internet-companies/. 
116. Id. (quoting Ryan Budish, a fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society). 
117. Id.
118. See id. (Apple example: Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Apple Addresses iCloud
Attacks While China Denies Hacking Allegations, MASHABLE (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://mashable.com/2014/10/21/apple-icloud-attacks-china/).  
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dysfunctional.119  The same goes for virtual private networks (VPNs), 
restriction of which “might lead to weaker data security and trade secrets 
being leaked to Chinese competitors.”120  "If connections are slow or 
VPNs unstable," certain applications that foreign companies use for 
work-related purposes cannot always be accessed from China.121  "Even 
simply transferring files to colleagues in other countries can be a trying 
experience."122  
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
There are two main problems in the area of cybersecurity law: 1) 
multiple jurisdictions, with different and conflicting laws, fracturing 
what should be a "globally integrated public sphere," and 2) "the risk of 
authoritarian or repressive regulation by nondemocratic" countries.123  
The "piecemeal nature" of international cybersecurity regulations 
leaves gaping holes in cybersecurity policy and security.124  To meet 
those needs one must approach a "cybersecurity regime not as 
geographically divided parts, but as a unified whole in a borderless 
cyberspace."125  The world’s super powers, like the United States and 
China, should set aside their differences and adopt a more centralized 
and mutual approach to cybersecurity.  However, unfortunately, it does 
not seem likely to happen. 
President of the United States Barack Obama when talking about 
“norms of state conduct in cyberspace,” said that those norms do not 
require swapping a “customary international law” for new regulations.126
He suggested that “[l]ong-standing international norm guiding state 
behavior—in times of peace and conflict—[should] also apply to 
cyberspace.”127  The term “international norm,” however, as referenced 
119. Gierow, supra note 92, at 5.
120. Asia-Pacific News, China Clamping Down on Use of VPNs to Evade Great Firewall,
CNBC (Jul. 20, 2017, 3:17 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/20/china-clamping-down-
on-use-of-vpns-to-evade-great-firewall.html; see Arthur Charles, China Cracks Down on 
VPN Use, THE GUARDIAN (May 13, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2011/may/13/china- cracks-down-on-vpn-use.  
121. Gierow, supra note 92, at 5–6.
122. Id. 
123. REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: A CALL FOR POLITICAL
INNOVATION, 36–40 (2012).  
124. Bagdasarova, supra note 2, at 1009.
125. Id. 
126. President of the United States of America, International Strategy For Cyberspace:
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to cyberspace is not well defined at the moment.128  Right now there are 
no set rules as to what is acceptable in cyberspace.129  
Certain observers of the Chinese nation believe that the Communist 
Party learned invaluable lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and correspondingly changed its ways of ruling for the better.130
However, these days’ people have become less hopeful, saying that the 
useful reforms that helped China’s successful rise have passed and “a 
new era of hard authoritarianism has begun.”131  Essentially, if the PRC 
truly wants to transition to a high-income society, it must undergo at 
least partial democratization.132  This would no doubt mean 
democratizing China’s cybersecurity strategies. 
IV. ANALYSIS
On the New Year’s Eve of 2015, China’s official state media 
broadcasted Xi Jinping’s annual message.133  Mr. Xi spoke to his 
audience about the year to come, saying that 2016 was going to signify 
“the beginning of the decisive phase” of China’s efforts to build a 
“moderately prosperous society.”134  Soon after, cybersecurity issues and 
enhancement of the protections against hacking and terrorism became 
the main focus of the decisive phase President Xi spoke of.135  
At the same time, the new Cybersecurity Law (the Law) served as 
a confirmation that when it comes to the Internet, China will take an 
independent stance.136  The whole host of regulations approved by the 
“country’s rubber-stamp Parliament” in 2016, showcase the way 
cyberspace is managed there.137   Ironically, comments on Chinese news 
and social media sites were largely censored after the state news media 
revealed the Law’s enactment.138  
128. Lee, supra note 51, at 960.
129. Science Monitor, supra note 33.
130. Chinese Politics, A Crisis of Faith 23, 25, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 16, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21688399-their-response-wobbly-markets-
chinas-leaders-reveal-their-fears-crisis-faith [hereinafter A Crisis of Faith].  
131. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. 
133. A Crisis of Faith, supra note 131, at 23.
134. Id. 
135. Adam Segal, Chinese Cyber Diplomacy in a New Era of Uncertainty, HOOVER
WORKING GROUP ON NAT’L SECURITY, TECH. & L., Aegis Paper Series No. 1703 (June 2, 
2017), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/segal_chinese_cyber_
diplomacy.pdf.
136. See Paul Mozur, China’s Internet Controls Will Get Stricter, to Dismay of Foreign
Business, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/
business/international/china-cyber-security-regulations.html.  
137. See id. 
138. Id. 
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 Even before the Law was enacted, it caused an enormous uproar 
in the international business community.139  The Head of Asia Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association told a forum in Hong Kong 
that the rules in the CSL were “worrying.”140  The expansive Law  and 
the Anti-Terrorism Law, which took effect on January 1st, 2016.141 The 
regulations indicate that the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) 
is ultimately in charge of setting the agenda of the broader set of policies 
concerning the CSL.142  The bill affects both domestic and foreign 
companies operating in Mainland China and spans over a wide range of 
activity in the sphere of the Internet and information communications 
technologies.143  
The Law is significant in scope and potentially overreaching in 
effect.144  As China’s first omnibus privacy and security regulation in the 
cyber realm, the CSL increases data protection in many aspects, but 
brings possible compliance challenges for the global community.145  It is 
particularly worrisome for businesses with “significant online/digital 
presence,” enterprises dependent on a telecommunications network, or 
the ones who rely on cross-border movement and sharing of business 
data.146  
James Zimmerman, chairman of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in China described the sweeping CSL as “a step backward 
139. Reuters, Business Groups Slam China’s Draft Cybersecurity Rules, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Aug. 12, 2016, 12:47 AM) http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/
article/2002550/business-groups-slam-chinas-draft-cybersecurity-rules (Letters from 46 
organizations to premier Li Keqiang said that cybersecurity regulations China was drafting 
would constrain trade and urged to revise them).  
140. Reuters, China Cybersecurity Law Likely to Harm Foreign Firms Operating on the
Mainland, Says Asia Finance Body Chief, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2044033/china-cybersecurity-law-
likely-harm-foreign-firms.  
141. Counter-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China (Passed by the 18th
Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress on December 27, 
2015), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/反恐怖主义法-（2015), /?lang=en (discussing
Chinas definition of terrorism, placing restrictions on the reporting of terrorist attacks and 
requirements for tech companies to provide support for counter-terrorism purposes ); see also 
Zunyou Zhou, Chinas Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Law (Jan. 23, 2016), 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/chinas-comprehensive-counter-terroJan. 23, 2016rism. 
142. Mozur, supra note 137.
143. China Adopts a Tough Law, supra note 142.
144. Baker & Mckenzie, Final Passage of China’s Cybersecurity Law (Nov. 25, 2016),
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2016/11/final-passage-of-chinas-
cybersecurity-law/. 
145. Gabriela Kennedy & Xiaoyan Zhang, China Passes Cybersecurity Law (Nov. 18,
2016), https://hk-lexiscn-com.libproxy.scu.edu/topic/legal.php?tps=cp&act=detail&id=
204423&newstype=3&isEnglish=Y. 
146. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 158.
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for innovation in China that won’t do much to improve security.”147
According to Chinese officials, the CSL is primarily designed to 
strengthen local networks against malicious hacking.148  However, in the 
eyes of foreign businesses, this piece of legislation looks very much like 
“a techno-nationalist Trojan horse.”149 
As a first comprehensive Law on cybersecurity, the CSL’s 
provisions are still very general and vague.150  A lot will depend on the 
implementing regulations and standards to be issued by the State 
Council, the CAC, Ministry of Public Security,151 and the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology.152 
Some of the Law’s content repeats existing rules adopted by China 
over the years and simply combines separate regulations into one.153
Prior existing rules were scattered under different regulations.154  The 
PRC believes that forming one unified Law improves enforcement and 
notifies the business community, as well as the general public, of the 
unprecedented cybersecurity threats within and beyond China’s 
borders.155  However, the power given to Chinese authorities under the 
CSL seems to have no limit.156  
1. Protection of key information infrastructure.
Article 31 of the CSL says in part:
The State shall . . . focus on protecting both the key information 
infrastructure used for public communications and information 
service, energy, transport, water conservancy, finance, public 
services, e-government affairs and other important industries and 
fields and other key information infrastructure that will result in 
serious damage to the national security, national economy and 
people’s livelihood and public interests if they are destroyed, there 
are lost functions or they are subject to data leakage.  The State 
147. China Adopts a Tough Law, supra note 142.
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Dr. Ulrike Glueck & Sammie Hu, PRC Cyber Security Law—What are the Most 
Important Impacts on Foreign Businesses?, LEXICOLOGY (Jul. 3, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=87d2de53-1499-46f9-8a1d-d5a8886c4d15. 
151. Dong, supra note 152, at 2.
152. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 158.
153. Samuel Yang, The New China Cybersecurity Law—Why Companies Should Care 





156. Kennedy & Zhang, supra note 159.
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encourages network operators other than key information 
infrastructure to participate in the protective system of key 
information infrastructure on a voluntary basis.157   
The CSL introduced the concept of key information infrastructure 
(KII) for the first time and imposed a series of heightened obligations for 
operators of KII.158  The definition of “key” or “critical,” as certain 
sources call it, is broader than anyone expected.159  Although not every 
company’s information technology infrastructure will likely be regarded 
as a KII, as it appears to be limited to those involving “national security, 
national economy and the people’s livelihood, or the public interest.”160
This definition is nevertheless overly broad and the State Council will 
have to define a more narrow scope of the KII later.161  The State Council 
will also likely have to specify the mandatory security measures that 
organizations operating KII will need to apply.162  The government has 
considerable leeway to bring industries not specifically singled out in the 
definition into the scope of the legislation at a later stage.163  Such  leeway 
helps the Communist Party to stay in control.164 
2. Information and data storage requirements for business
entities. 
Article 37 of the CSL says: 
Key information infrastructure operators shall store personal 
information and important data gathered and produced during 
operations within the territory of the People’s Republic of China. 
Where it is really necessary to provide such information and data to 
overseas parties due to business requirements, a security assessment 
shall be conducted in accordance with the measures formulated by 
the national cyberspace administration authority in concert with the 
relevant departments under the State Council.  Where the laws and 
administration regulations have other provisions, those provisions 
157. The Law, supra note 151.
158. Dong, supra 152, at 3 (this source uses the term critical information infrastructure,
however, different sources use terms “key” and “critical” interchangeably). 
159. China Adopts a Tough Law, supra note 142.
160. Yang, supra note 167.
161. Final Cybersecurity Law Enacted in China, Privacy & Information Security Law
Blog (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2016/11/08/final-cybersecurity-
law-enacted-china/ [hereinafter Privacy & Information].  
162. Id.
163. Kennedy & Zhang, supra note 159.
164. See National Security, Everything Xi Wants, THE ECONOMIST (Jul. 4, 2015), 
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21656689-new-national-security-law-hints-
communist-partys-fears-everything-xi-wants. 
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shall prevail.165  
 The general interpretation of this provision points to the 
obligation for foreign companies to keep servers for users in China 
within China’s borders.166  Even with an increase in cost, many foreign 
companies have already complied with this requirement.167  
 The overly broad residency requirements place entry obstacles 
for both Chinese and foreign entities, which can hinder economic 
growth.168  This storage provision separates China from the global digital 
economy.169  Positions like this bring China closer to cyber sovereignty 
that it desires, but also make companies distrust the safekeeping of their 
data while on Chinese territory.  Those companies worry that the Law 
will require additional expenses and increase the risk of data theft.170  
 The security assessment provision creates yet another barrier for 
businesses who want to break into China’s market.171  Chinese KIIs, 
under the literal reading of the CSL, must undergo a stringent assessment 
by relevant Chinese authorities prior to any cross-border information 
transfer.172  The security assessment requires business entities to identify 
the need for data export and creates the risk of personal information 
being leaked along with potential compromises to national security.173 
Article 38 specifies the requirement for operators of KII to undergo a 
network security assessment at least once a year and “submit the 
detection and assessment situations as well as improvement measures to 
the relevant departments.”174   The Secretariat of the National 
Information Security Standardization Technical Committee has issued a 
“Draft for Comment” with an October 2017 deadline for concerned 
entities to submit opinions on the security assessment of cross-border 
information transfer.175  So presently, the Chinese authorities still have 
165. The Law, supra 151 (emphasis added).
166. Josh Horwitz, China’s Bewildering New Cybersecurity Law is Keeping Foreign Tech
Firms Out of the Country, QUARTZ (Nov. 7, 2016), http://qz.com/829248/chinas-new-
cybersecurity-law-is-so-vague-that-its-keeping-foreign-tech-firms-out-of-the-country/ (For 
instance AirBnB, over a year after it entered the Chinese market via a joint venture, announced 
that it would move its Chinese user data to a Chinese location). 
167. Id.
168. Controversial Cybersecurity Law, supra note 112.
169. Id.
170. China Adopts a Tough Law, supra note 142.
171. See Kennedy, supra note 155.
172. Id.
173. China’s Cyber Security Law: With More Questions than Answers, What Steps Can 
You Take Now?, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Jul. 31, 2017), https://www.mofo.com/resources/
publications/170731-chinas-cyber-security-law.html.  
174. The Law, supra note 151.
175. Comments Sought on the Information Security Technology—Guidelines for Security
Assessment of Data Cross-border Transfer and Other Five National Standards, 
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to decide on how, when, and at what cost the security assessments will 
take place. 
The residency, data storage and security assessment provisions 
make it challenging for businesses to operate in China.  Underscoring 
the possible glooming outcome for many international companies in 
China, Baker & McKenzie specialists point out that: “[i]n a worst-case 
scenario, many foreign business operators may be required to carve-out 
China from their global or regional technology, infrastructure/backbone, 
and/or become mired in time-consuming regulatory approvals for the 
export or sharing of data with entities outside China.”176 
3. A new provision on the protection of network security.
“Networks,” according to Article 76 of the CSL, includes networks
and systems that are composed of computers and other information 
terminals or facilities used to “collect, save, transmit, exchange, and 
process information.”177  Network operators mandatorily follow all the 
legal obligations under the CSL.178  The Law also maintains that 
promoting and “safeguarding the national cyberspace sovereignty” 
within the networks is a fundamental principle.179  
The list of further obligations (and sadly no rights) for network 
operators under Articles 21, 24, 25, and 28 respectively include: the 
compliance with the requirements of tiered system for cybersecurity 
protections; the authentication of users’ real identity; the formulation of 
cybersecurity emergency strategies; the assistance and support for 
investigative authorities.180  
The panic caused by all the obligations that the companies have to 
abide by, may be unsubstantiated.181  The new Law brings back the 
concept of the “tiered system” of cybersecurity protections, familiar to 
businesses, which have complied with 1994 Regulations for Safety 
https://hk.lexiscn.com/latest_message.php?id=241041&isSearchResult=1&url=news.php%2
53Fact%253Ddetail%2526id%253D241041&access=content_detail&lang=cn (“[t]he Draft 
for Comment sets forth procedures, key points and methods for the security assessment of the 
cross-border transfer of personal information and important data”) (citing to关于征求《信息
技术 安全技术 匿名实体鉴别 第4部分：基于弱秘密的机制》等6项国家标准意见的通
, National Information Security Standardization Technocal Committee (Aug. 30, 2017,
http://www.tc260.org.cn/zdetail_g.jsp?id=20170830193813).  
176. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 158.




181. See Yang, supra note 167 (The Administrative Measures for Hierarchical Protection
of Information Security in 2007 also classified information into tiers with higher ones 
concerning national security issues). 
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Protection of Computer Information Systems.182  Rules regarding 
network access, domain registration, fixed or mobile phone, information 
publication and instant messaging services, which require users to 
provide their real identity information, are restatements of the Decision 
of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 
Strengthening Network Information Protection (2012).183  The fact that 
the Law incorporates multiple restatements of the older regulations 
signifies that businesses, with established presence in China, may have 
compliance polices already in place and should not worry about the new 
Law’s requirements.184 
However, grounds for worrying still exist.  The provision requiring 
certification for important network equipment and software, for instance 
seems deceitful.185  As foreign companies, aware of China’s pirating 
history, fear that compliance will require turning over security keys and 
core tech, which could be “shared with” state-owned competitors.186
Similarly, Article 10’s provision, requiring the construction and 
operation of Internet services that are secure and stable, are likely to 
advantage Chinese hardware firms like Lenovo and Huawei and local 
cloud operating providers like Tencent or Alibaba.187  
Article 65 provides that KII operators might violate the Law if their 
products or services have not passed safety inspections.188 A threat of 
such violations of the Law is especially worrisome because the nature of 
the safety inspections remains unclear.189  In a similar fashion, Article 21 
states that “specialized network security products” must meet a set of 
standards released in a “catalog” by the State Council, which are yet to 
be revealed.190 
4. Government supervision, security reviews, and technical
support 
The security reviews for information and communications 
technology products and services under new rules constitute technical 
barriers to trade under the World Trade Organization and may 
potentially undermine the security of data.191  
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support and assistance to public or national security agencies when 
investigating a crime.192  Additionally, network operators are required to 
adopt technical measures to oversee and record their operations and to 
preserve related logs for at least 6 months.193  
Also, under Article 22, network and service providers have to 
inform the users and relevant authorities if any security or bug has been 
detected.194  This requirement obligates providers to offer constant 
security maintenance and prohibits them from installing malware in their 
products.195  Article 23 requires key network facilities to comply with 
relevant national standards and compulsory certification 
requirements.196  For example, such facilities can only be offered for sale 
once they have complied with the certification provision from the 
qualified organization.197  All the unnecessary burdens for network 
operators and service providers contribute to the overall apprehension of 
the China’s market participants. 
5. Protection of Personal Information.
Regarding the protection of personal information, the CSL restates
the obligations, which have already existed across the PRC’s laws and 
regulations.198  
The familiar privacy laws’ requirements restated in the new 
Cybersecurity Law include informed consent and the use of personal 
information only for a purpose agreed upon by the relevant individual.199 
Provisions on the collection and use of the personal information also 
reiterate the “principles of legitimacy, rightfulness and necessity.”200
Article 42 requires the adoption of security protection measures for 
personal information and incorporates new provisions like data breach 
notification requirements and data depersonalization as an exception to 
192. Privacy & Information, supra note 175 (“If it is ultimately unwilling to offer
reciprocal access to its own market, China cannot assume that it will indefinitely continue to 
enjoy open and unhindered access to the [other]’s,” the EU Chamber president Joerg Wuttke 
said). 
193. Id. 
194. Dong, supra note 152, at 2–3. 
195. Id. at 3. 
196. Id.
197. Id. 
198. Dong, supra note 152, at 3 (See the Decision of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress on Strengthening Network Information Protection (2012), the 
Provisions on the Protection of Personal Information of Users of Telecommunications and 
Internet Services (2013) and the Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests 
(2013 Revision)). 
199. Privacy & Information, supra note 175. 
200. Id.; See Article 41, Law, note 151 (quoting the Article).
2018] CHINA'S NEW CYBERSECURITY LAW 159 
inform and consent requirements.201  The consent exception for data that 
cannot identify specific individuals “is believed to be a major win for 
companies engaging in Big Data business such as online precision 
marketing companies using cookies technologies.”202  The breach 
notification requirements, introduced for the first time, might magnify 
the adverse effects to the public image of the data controllers and 
processors.203  Therefore, companies should consider this when 
developing crisis management strategies.204  
Article 43 adds an individual right to question the correctness or 
request deletion of personal information in cases where the information 
is inaccurate or used for a purpose not agreed upon.205  Additionally, theft 
and illegal sale of personal data have already been criminalized in China 
under Amendment No. 7 (2009) and Amendment No. 9 (2015) to the 
PRC Criminal Law.206  These penalties for breach are considerably 
harsher than the ones before: 
Breach of the new law will be subject to, according to the seriousness 
of the breach, penalties such as warning, order of correction, fines 
(up to RMB 1,000,000), forfeiture of illegal gains, suspension of 
business, and/or revocation of operation permit and business license. 
Individual wrongdoers are also subject to a fine of up to RMB 
1,000,000, detention, fixed-term or lifetime ban for key positions in 
the network security and network operation areas, and/or even 
criminal penalties.207  
B. The CSL’s vague language
China critics say the country uses extremely vague wording in its
legislations to give flexibility to policymakers on how to implement 
laws.208  Keeping the laws so vague that they are impossible to follow, 
has essentially been a “tried-and-true tactic” employed by the PRC to 
keep foreign companies away from China.209  The unfortunate lack of 
clarity on how to comply with the Law is a huge turn off for overseas 
enterprises.210  “Foreign companies who have the technology and have 
the impetus to get into the China [are] not getting the necessary 
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information to do so.  And since the information isn’t there, they’re shut 
out of the market.”211  
The CSL puts businesses in danger of government meddling or 
losing business in the world’s second largest economy.  Uncertain, vague 
language of the Law creates an uncertain business environment.  Foreign 
companies willing to see how this Law untangles will no doubt have a 
chance to succeed, but the risk is real and the penalties for non-
compliance are harsh.  After June 2017, the foreign investors tempted 
into entering the Chinese market are bound to face challenges directly 
related to the new Law. 
On the positive side, the regulations might not significantly change 
the ordinary course of business.212  Many of the rules have already been 
in effect, just not codified.  Samuel Yang Honqquan, a partner of AnJie 
Law Firm suggests that:  
[I]nstead of trying to seek the hidden meanings of the new law and
overstating its downsides, [foreign companies doing business in
China] should watch closely the policy changes in their own
industries where special rules may be issued by the regulators having
a more direct impact on the ways of doing business of these foreign
companies.213
V. PROPOSAL
Cybersecurity has become a significant area of international and 
domestic concern.214  To address this issue the United States and China 
have released various cybersecurity strategies.215  Unfortunately, those 
strategies did not gain much momentum.  These two superpowers need 
a more viable strategy that will actually stick. 
Security surveillance and cyber confrontations that the United 
States and China engage in, hurt both countries’ economies and 
undermines the protections of their IP networks.  China’s vague laws and 
overreaching security requirements restrict freedom of speech and throw 
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up barriers to global companies.  In the United States, cyberspace is 
talked about like it is the ocean, where nobody owns it and people can 
just traverse through it as they please.216  U.S. companies like AT&T or 
Verizon, actually own quite a bit of it.217 And even though federal 
government cannot always compel everyone to act,218 the cyber-law 
literature suggests that cyberspace can be effectively regulated 
considering that physical facilities that make the online activity possible 
are subject to government control.219  Additionally, companies have to 
themselves strive to improve the infrastructure within the private 
sector.220   
The cyber community points out that certain national government 
actions may negatively affect another nation or its citizens.221  “As one 
national government doesn’t have sovereignty over another, the latter’s 
behavior will not be subject to former’s regulations.”222  This presents a 
great flaw in the international law, and limits what a nation like the 
United States can do in response to another nation’s, such as China’s, 
aggressive attack, or vice versa.223  
Luckily, the PRC is not completely averse to international 
cooperation on cybersecurity.224  Even though unsurprisingly, China’s 
and other countries’ “International Code of Conduct for Information 
Security” proposal defended the legitimacy of the governments’ control 
of the online flow of information, read positively, it did try setting at 
least some rules for proper cybersecurity behavior.225 
Because both countries’ privacy and cybersecurity systems are 
flawed, but not hopelessly so, I propose the European Union approach 
to cybersecurity which rejects an idea of governmental scrutiny and a 
contention that civil societies cannot have free will when it comes to the 
use of technology.226
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Cyberattacks have increased in scope and quantity in recent years. 
They undermine not only national security of the countries around the 
world, but also the free flow of information and free trade.  Thus, an 
international cybersecurity treaty is in order.  However, such a treaty 
would only be successful if the principal actors of the global community 
would craft something mutually beneficial and make an earnest effort to 
comply with it, leading by example.  Super powers feel like they have to 
support a defensive and offensive approach in their military and 
economic cyber policies, but when it comes to civil societies, 
governments are not as compelled to defend them.227  The EU stands for 
an approach that gives the civil societies a sense of security they need 
when it comes to cyber threats.228  Unlike the United States and China, 
that approach the issue of security in cyberspace through the logic of 
national security and cyber superiority, the EU approach is legalistic and 
protective.229  The EU cybersecurity concept focuses on fighting 
cybercrime, and on resilience to ensure rapid recovery from cyber 
attacks.230  EU capability development focuses on building capacities 
that enable detection, response, and recovery from sophisticated cyber 
threats.231  In the military field, the EU is engaged in cyber self-
protection and assured access to cyber space to enable its operations and 
missions.232  
At this point, the EU can help build consensus on cyber-security 
issues in the international community.  Also, if both the United States 
and China would support a European framework regarding 
cybersecurity, the EU would be more open to establishing definite 
international norms that would prevent the threat of covert offenses by 
various states.  
CONCLUSION 
It is incredibly difficult to justify a Law which places censors on 
the freedom of expression, is costly for trade and innovation, and creates 
friction between the global powers.  Terrorism, whether in the physical 
world or cyber realm, does not exist because of Google or Facebook, as 
China implicates.  Social media, which does not promote an immoral 
society or uncivilized behavior, could even work to China’s favor in 
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advancement “of the core socialist values.”233  In addition, other ways 
exist to address the growing threats of cyberattacks domestically and on 
the global arena.  China’s sweeping new Cybersecurity Law is not one 
of those ways. 
Chinese officials should listen to Eric Xu,234 who more than a year 
ago warned: “If we’re not open, if we don’t bring in the world’s best 
technology, we’ll never have true information security.”235  That 
eloquent rejection of techno-nationalism came from a man who is co-
chief executive of Huawei.236
The United States is likewise not cyber efficient at the moment. 
The country often engages in political espionage and hacking with the 
goal of preventing terrorist attacks, yet at the same time, it critiques 
similar actions coming from the Chinese government.  At some point the 
United States has to become more concerned about public use of 
protective technologies and less involved in the behavior that 
perpetuates the conflict between the two countries. 
Since neither country’s cybersecurity strategies have worked much 
to their advantage, both the United States and China need to consider 
taking a different route.  The EU approach can not only be beneficial to 
both superpowers, but also unify the rest of the international community 
on issues surrounding cybersecurity.  Cybersecurity is inherently 
transnational.  Thus, China cannot isolate itself from the rest of the 
world, as the country wants to do.  For the United States, a new strategy 
would give an opportunity to improve and focus on the protective means 
of cybersecurity, which in turn will help fight the cybercrimes and 
prevent the unwanted cyberattacks. 
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